20 de April, 2026

Changes to the Nationality Law in 2026: main developments and practical impact

Roberta Fraser, Managing Partner da BRF Legal.

In recent years, the Portuguese Nationality Law has ceased to be a relatively stable framework and has become one of the most dynamic areas of legislative policy. Numerous legal changes have taken place over the past decade in a field historically regarded as structured and predictable, as it concerns a fundamental right with sensitive and strategic implications, both at the individual and collective levels.

Once again, we are about to undergo another legislative amendment on this matter, with the second version of the bill aimed at amending the Portuguese Nationality Law currently under review by the President of the Republic. If enacted, it will introduce significant changes to the existing framework. This new phase arises in a context of tension with the Constitutional Court, which raised several objections to the first version approved by Parliament.

Despite the legal deadlines still in force for requesting a new review by the Constitutional Court and for the final decision by the President of the Republic, it is unlikely that the new bill will not be enacted soon, covering most of the proposed changes.

Against this background, this article analyses the changes envisaged in the 2026 package: the extension of residence periods, the strengthening of integration requirements, the end of simplified pathways and the introduction of criminal loss of nationality. Without resorting to simplified interpretations or media-driven narratives about “citizenship for sale,” the aim is to highlight the main proposed changes and assess whether we are facing a mere tightening of rules or a structural redefinition of the concept of political community, with relevant impacts on legitimate expectations, proportionality, equality among nationals and Portugal’s position within the European citizenship landscape.

1. From an integration model to a security filter: the core of the new requirements

1.1 Jus soli – children born in Portugal to foreign parents

One of the areas where changes will be most strongly felt concerns the rules applicable to children born in Portugal to foreign parents. Until now, the logic was relatively simple: if one of the parents lived in Portugal in a minimally stable manner – with legal residence at the time of birth or at least one year of residence, even without a perfect legal status – this opened the door to Portuguese nationality for the child. The underlying message was: if the child’s life is being built here and the family has some level of rootedness, it makes sense for the child to be Portuguese by origin.

The new text approved by Parliament radically changes this starting point. Now, for a child born in Portugal to acquire Portuguese nationality by origin through this route, one of the parents must have legally resided in the country for at least five years at the time of birth. In practice, families with less than five years of legal residence, regardless of their level of actual integration, are excluded. Portuguese jus soli – the idea that being born here matters – becomes much more restricted. It remains formally called jus soli, but the real weight shifts to the duration of legal residence of the parents rather than the child’s actual life in Portugal.

1.2 “Effective ties to the national community” for grandchildren of Portuguese citizens

A less highlighted point in this package of changes, but one that may in practice create significant challenges for grandchildren of Portuguese nationals, is the increased requirements to demonstrate “effective links to the national community” as a precondition for acquiring nationality by origin through this route.

Previously, the law focused mainly on aspects such as speaking Portuguese and not having serious criminal convictions or security concerns. Now, this concept is expanded to include a much denser list of requirements: it is no longer sufficient to master the language; applicants must demonstrate knowledge of history, culture and national symbols, understand the rights and duties associated with citizenship, declare adherence to the principles of the democratic rule of law, and not be involved in certain types of criminal activity or linked to international sanctions. All of this is presented as a way to ensure that those who become Portuguese nationals are “truly integrated” and do not pose risks.

1.3 Naturalisation and residence: extended timelines and strengthened requirements

Looking at the “classic” naturalisation route, the change is easy to understand even for those not following legislative detail: the clock has slowed down. Until now, the general rule was clear: after five years of legal residence in Portugal, a foreign national could, in principle, apply for nationality, subject to other requirements (adulthood, language, absence of certain criminal convictions, etc.). There was debate as to whether five years was too long or too short, but the timeline was stable and served as a basis for individuals to organise their lives—studying, investing, bringing family members.

With the new package, this timeline is significantly extended. The general rule is no longer five years for most applicants but, broadly, seven years for nationals of CPLP or European Union countries and ten years for most other foreign nationals.

At the same time, naturalisation ceases to be merely a matter of time, language proficiency and a clean criminal record, and becomes a comprehensive test of integration. The law now requires not only command of the Portuguese language but also proof of knowledge of history, culture and national symbols, understanding of citizenship rights and duties, a declaration of adherence to the principles of the democratic rule of law, and evidence of minimum economic capacity.

Finally, there is a technical detail with very concrete consequences: how residence time is calculated. The previous law allowed, in certain situations, the time spent in Portugal awaiting a decision on a residence permit application to be counted, preventing administrative delays from penalising applicants.This mechanism was criticised and became involved in retroactivity controversies analysed by the Constitutional Court, which highlighted the need to protect legitimate expectations of those already in the system.

The current solution is unequivocal: the new law closes that door, makes residence counting stricter and no longer allows the time taken by the State to make decisions to benefit the applicant.The result is a framework in which the question is no longer simply “how long have you lived here?” but rather “have you lived here long enough, do you know the country well enough, is your economic situation in order and do you pass all security filters?”. Naturalisation remains legally possible, but it is no longer primarily determined by time; it now requires cumulative verification of linguistic, cultural, economic and security requirements.

1.4 Investors and Residence Permits for Investment

The 2026 package also affects a very specific group: holders of Residence Permits for Investment, commonly known as the “Golden Visa” regime.

For years, the regime was presented as a relatively clear pathway: qualified investment, obtaining a residence permit and, after five years of legal residence, the possibility to apply for nationality under the Nationality Law in force at the time. It was part of the incentive package: nationality was not being sold, but a pathway with defined rules and a timeline was.

The changes now approved significantly shift this timeline. The general naturalisation rule now requires seven or ten years of legal residence, depending on the applicant’s category, while at the same time strengthening substantive requirements—language, history, culture and national symbols, and a declaration of adherence to the principles of the rule of law. The transitional rule only protects nationality applications already pending, ensuring they remain subject to the previous law, but does not establish any specific transitional regime for those still in the residence phase, including investors who structured their plans based on a five-year horizon.

The absence of a specific transitional regime for holders of previously issued investment residence permits raises questions regarding the protection of their legitimate expectations. For example, maintaining the five-year requirement for permits issued before a certain date, or at least recognising enhanced protection for investments made under the previous framework. This would not mean “shielding” the Golden Visa or turning any investment into a guaranteed path to citizenship. Rather, it would align the treatment of these investors with the standard of protection of legitimate expectations that the Constitutional Court has consistently upheld when the State changes nationality rules.

1.5 Sephardic regime: from symbolic gesture to a nearly closed door

When it was created, this regime was presented as a gesture of historical recognition: opening a pathway to naturalisation for descendants of communities expelled or persecuted during the Inquisition was a way for the State to say “we acknowledge what happened and wish to repair it, even symbolically.” The law allowed these descendants to apply for Portuguese nationality based on their belonging to Sephardic communities of Portuguese origin, without having to fulfil all aspects of the traditional residence and integration pathway required of other foreign nationals.

Over time, however, the regime became increasingly restrictive. Organic Law no. 1/2024 had already introduced additional requirements, such as demonstrating a more concrete connection to Portugal and, in some cases, minimum periods of legal residence, bringing these applications closer to the general logic of “effective links to the national community.” The new package goes further: Parliamentary Decree no. 48/XVII expressly repeals the core provisions supporting the Sephardic regime—namely paragraphs 5, 7 and 13 of Article 6—leaving only transitional rules in force to deal with applications already pending when previous changes came into effect. In practical terms, this means that the special entry route through the “Sephardic door” is essentially closed to new applications.

1.6 Ancillary penalty of loss of nationality: when citizenship enters the catalogue of sanctions

Among all the changes, perhaps none has such limited practical impact yet such strong symbolic weight as the introduction of the ancillary penalty of loss of nationality in Article 69.º D of the Penal Code. Broadly speaking, the new rule allows individuals holding dual nationality—Portuguese and another—to be sanctioned, in addition to imprisonment, with the loss of Portuguese nationality when convicted of particularly serious crimes carrying substantial prison sentences. The law seeks to avoid statelessness (loss is only possible if the individual holds another nationality) and provides for the possibility of reacquisition after a certain period under strict conditions.

However, from a constitutional and theoretical perspective, the rupture is profound. Until now, the Portuguese model was described—by the Constitutional Court itself—as a paradigm of absolute prohibition of deprivation of citizenship, allowing only voluntary loss (for example, when someone requests to renounce Portuguese nationality after acquiring another). This view was linked to the idea that nationality is the “core” of a person’s status within the State and cannot be used as punishment, as this would create a distinction between nationals subject to loss of citizenship and those protected from it, based on possession of another nationality. By introducing loss of nationality into the catalogue of penalties, even exceptionally, the legislator takes a clear step towards treating citizenship as an instrument of criminal policy.

On this point, one political party has already taken action, without waiting for the assessment of the President of the Republic, António José Seguro. The Socialist parliamentary group has decided to maintain consistency and will again request a constitutional review of the provisions on loss of nationality, on the grounds that there are unconstitutional elements in the amendment to the Penal Code. At issue is, for example, the possibility that two individuals committing the same crime may receive different penalties, with only one losing their nationality.

With regard to the Nationality Law, the Socialist parliamentary group considers that the unconstitutional elements have been resolved and will therefore not request a further constitutional review of this diploma. However, it considers that the new Nationality Law, approved by PSD, Chega, Iniciativa Liberal and CDS, is a flawed law that “applies incorrect criteria and does not improve life in the community.”

2. Portugal in the European landscape: between integration and securit

An analysis of the 2026 amendments invites us to situate Portugal on a spectrum which, in European terms, ranges from inclusive/rights-based models to restrictive/security-oriented models. At the inclusive end of the spectrum, nationality is seen as the culmination of a process of integration: moderate residence requirements, a relatively open jus soli for minors raised in the country, a strong stabilisation of the bond of citizenship, and a rejection of punitive loss of citizenship, particularly when directed solely at certain groups of nationals. This is the picture that the Constitutional Court largely paints of the previous Portuguese model, emphasising the prohibition on the deprivation of citizenship and the requirement for equality between nationals by birth and those who have acquired it, in line with the European Convention on Nationality.

In the security sphere, by contrast, nationality is increasingly taking on the role of a filter: residence periods are being extended, stringent sets of linguistic, cultural, economic and security requirements are being introduced, the grounds for refusal or objection are being broadened, and the loss of nationality is being accepted as a means of responding to serious crime or behaviour deemed incompatible with loyalty to the state. Packages 48/XVII and 49/XVII clearly bring Portugal closer to this second pole: they raise the temporal and material thresholds for access to naturalisation, reinforce the security dimension in the definition of ‘effective connection to the national community’, and break with the tradition of an absolute prohibition on the deprivation of citizenship by allowing for criminal-based loss for certain dual nationals who have been convicted.

From a comparative perspective, a detailed analysis of the approaches taken by other Member States would require a separate study of their respective legislation, which goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it can be said that Portugal is moving away from the image of a ‘model pupil’ of inclusive citizenship – which the Constitutional Court helped to consolidate – and is moving closer to systems that use nationality as an extension of migration and criminal policy. This shift has consequences for how the country is perceived in a European debate in which some legal systems discuss pathways to citizenship as instruments of integration and inclusion, whilst others reinforce the security and control dimensions. In the Portuguese case, the central issue is no longer merely who enters, but under what conditions the State is willing to recognise and maintain the bond of citizenship which it itself, until now, treated as a specially protected status.

Conclusion

The picture that emerges from this set of changes is relatively clear: the proposal approved by Parliament points towards a model of citizenship that is more demanding, takes longer to obtain and is more heavily influenced by security concerns than the one Portugal has established over recent decades.
Residence periods are being extended, integration requirements are being tightened, special pathways such as the Sephardic scheme are being closed, and the loss of nationality is being introduced as a penalty, albeit on an exceptional basis. The pendulum is swinging away from inclusive and stabilising citizenship and towards a paradigm in which nationality is primarily a filter – legal, cultural, economic and security-related.

The succession of reforms, with advances and setbacks, has also been a source of complexity: repeatedly changing the rules in an area that the Constitutional Court has identified as fundamental to the status of a person within the State is, in itself, a factor of instability and of erosion of trust in the legal system.
It is therefore important to emphasise a very simple point that is sometimes lost in the noise: the law currently in force is still that resulting from Organic Law No. 1/2024. Until a new amendment is definitively approved and effectively comes into force, it is this framework that applies to those applying for Portuguese nationality today.

Those who already meet the current requirements – whether through residence, family ties or special schemes still in place – have no advantage in waiting for a scenario that, by all indications, will be more demanding. On the contrary, in a context of frequent legislative change, the prudent course of action is not to squander a legal framework that is more predictable and less restrictive than the one on the horizon.

Nationality is not merely an administrative ‘title’; it is the way in which we define who belongs, on an equal footing, to the political community. The frequency of legislative changes in an area identified by the Constitutional Court as fundamental to the status of a person within the State constitutes, in itself, a factor of instability and an erosion of legal certainty.

By Roberta Fraser, Managing Partner at BRF Legal.